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This article propose& to look at thr
ee of the issues highlighted 
by the recent Lion Breweries actions
 in warding off a possible 
takeover. These are the application
 of S.40 of the Companies 
Act 1955, the question of propriety 
of purpose and the effect 
of ratification. The events leading
 up to the defe nsive manoeuvre 
are well known. The actual manoeuv
re may well require some 
elucidation. 
Two directors of Lion founded the A
ndrocles Corporation. Lion 
then alloted 25 million ordinary sha
res at 50~ each (par value) 
to Androcles. Androcles, a private 
company with a capital of 
25 million dollars,comprised of 50 m
illion SO~ shares, paid 
for these Lion shares by the allotme
nt of 25 million ordinaries 
at their par value of SO~ each to L
ion. 
Androcles then made a further issue 
of 25 million 50~ shares 
to its two directors, Sir Clifford 
Plimmer and Mr R C Bradshaw. 
These were unpaid. By a trust deed 
signed on the 6th of 
January 1978 these two bound themsel
ves to hold the shares in 
trust for the members of Lion as at 
the date of distribution 
of the trust. 
Thus we end up with Androcles owning
 27 % of Lion~ Lion owning 
half of Androcles and Mr Bradshaw an
d Sir Clifford Plimmer owning 
the other half, subject to a trust f
or the members of Lion with 
reversion at some future undetermine
d date. 
So 
Lion 25m 50~ shares 
25m 50~ shares Androcles 
12½m ../ ~12½m 
50~ shares 506 shares 
Plimmer Bradshaw 
Thus the 2 Androcles shareholders wh
o were also Lion directors, 
and Lion,controlled the total voting
 power at a Lion general 
meeting. Given the average 32-35 % t
urnout of votes at a 
pre-Androcles Lion general meeting, 
this 27% would ordinarily 
be enough to control the company. T
his makes it extremely 
difficult for an outside purchaser t
o get control of Lion. It 
also makes it impossible for one to 
pass a special resolution 
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against the wishes of the directors of Androcles. This is, of 
course, due to the fact that the requisite 75% majority could 
not be obtained against a 27% opposition. 
However this move seems to be of questionable validity. The 
Registrar of Companies refused to register the shares on the 
ground that the scheme was void under Section 40 of the Companies 
Act; allegations of improper purpose made the directors of 
Lion seek and gain a ratification from the shareholders. But 
the twin questions of whether the ratification was necessary 
or effectual are still at large. This paper will look at the 
three questions detailed above and attempt to comment on the law, 
with special reference to the Lion situation. 
SECTION 40 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 1955 
A company may not hold shares in itself. 1. This prohibition 
is based on the belief that th•s amounts to a reduction of 
capital. 2. 
What of the situation where a company owns sufficient shares 
to have control of another company, or has effective control 
over another company without actually possessing a controlling 
interest, and that other company itself has de facto control over 
the first? The effect is that of the first company owning its 
own shares and yet the situation is clearly outside the rule in 
II Trevor v. Whitworth. For the company does not own its own shares; 
it does, however, have all the opportunities for abuse inherent 
in such ownership. 
Section 40 is the attempt made by the New Zealand Legislatur2 
to meet the deficiency of the common law in such a situation 
of incestuous ownership. 
1. Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) 12 AC 409 
2. Professor Gower in his 'Modern Company Law' at 112 also notes 
dangers of abuse by directors in this situation. 
The Structure of S.40. S.40(1) states "a body corporate cannot be a 
member of a company which is its holding company and any allotment er 
transfe!:" of shares in a company to its subsidiary shall be Yoid." 
This is subject to fou~ 
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exceptions. 
These are to be found in Sections 40
(2)-(5). 
S.40(2) excepts situations where the 
subsidiary is a personal 
representative or a trustee. Neither
 company is dead and neither 
holds shares under trust. 
S.40(3) applies to allow continued m
embership where the 
subsiduary held shares prior to the c
oming into force of the 
act. This is not the situation here.
 
S.40(4) includes nominees for a body 
corporate within subsections 
1 and 3 subject to 2. The position o
f nominees will be 
developed further but for the purpose
s of this argument it 
suffices to say that it certainly doe
s not exempt Lion or 
Androcles here. 
S.40(5) relates only to companies unl
imited or limited by guarantee. 
Lion and Androcles are limited by sha
res. In summary none of 
the exceptions apply to exempt Lion f
rom S.40(1). 
What then is a holding company? 
Section 3 of the act states that a ho
lding company "means a 
holding company as defined in S.158 o
f this Act." 
Section 158(4) reads "For the purpose
s of this Act, a company 
shall be deemed to be another compan
y's holding company if, 
but only if, that other company is it
s subsidiary." As this 
is the only reference to a holding co
mpany in S.158 we must 
assume that this 'deeming' is the 'de
finition' referred 'to in 
S.2. Academic criticism apart, it su
ffices. However it leaves 
us with the question of what a subsid
iary company is for the 
purposes of the Act. 
Returning to Section 2 we find that "
Subsidiary" means "a 
subsidiary as defined by S.158 of thi
s Act." Back in S.158 
we find that, "S.158(1) for the purpo
ses of this Act, a company 
shall, subject to the provisions of s
ubsection three of this 
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section, be deemed to be a subsidiary of another if,
 but only 
if: 
(a) That other company either: 
(i) Is a member of it and controls the composition 
of board of directors; or 
(ii) Holds more than half in nominal value of its 
equity share capital as defined in subsection 
five of this section; or 
(b) The first-mentioned company is a subsidiary of 
any 
company which is that other company's subsidiary . 
Androcles and Lion are both members (i.e. sharehold
ers) in the 
other. Does either control the composition of the 
other's 
board of directors? 
S.158(2) elucidates what control of the board of di
rectors is 
'deemed' to be. It reads "For the purposes of subse
ction one 
of this section, the composition of a company's boa
rd of 
directors shall be deemed to be controlled by anoth
er company 
if, but only if, that other company by the exercise 
of some power 
exercisable by it without the consent or concurrence
 of any 
other person can appoint or remove the holders of a
ll or a 
majority of the directorships; but for the purposes 
of this 
provision that other company shall be deemed to have
 power to 
appoint to a directorship with respect to which any 
of the 
following conditions is satisfied, that is to say: 
(a) That a person cannot be appointed thereto witho
ut 
the exercise in his favour by that other company 
of such power as aforesaid; or 
(b) That a person's appointment thereto follows nec
essarily 
from his appointment as director of that other comp
any; 
or 
(c) That the directorship is held by that other com
pany 
itself or by a subsidiary of it . 
It can be argued that a director can be appointed to
 the 
Androcles B~ rd "without the exercise in his favour~
' of such 
a power in terms of (a). For if Lion abstained and 
the existing 
directors votes were used then the nppointment would
 follow. 
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This could well be read as being a non-exercise of power and 
thus not within the section. Similarly if Lion tried _to 
remove a director against the wishes of the existing Androcles 
directors then a deadlock and the status quo would result. The 
trust deed expressly reserves the discretion of the directors 
to vote independently of any "purported direction, recommendation 
or direction of Lion Breweries Limited or its Directors ... " 
The other view is that the decision to abstain from voting is 
in itself an exercise of power. Thus the fact that Lion's 
50% holding can block any change in the status quo is sufficient 
to satisfy S.158(2)a which would lead to the conclusion that Lion 
does indeed control the board of directors and thus Androcles 
is a subsidiary within the meaning of S.158. 
We move on to a consideration of S.158(a) which indicated that a 
company will be a holding company if it"holds more than half 
in nominal value of its equity share capital as defined in 
subsection five of tis section." 
Lion holds one hal~ of the issued Androcles capital exactly. 
It is to be noted however that subsection five defines equity 
share capital as "issued share capital excluding any part thereof 
which, neither as respects dividends nor as respects capital, 
carries any right to participate beyond a specified amount in 
a distribution. The 25 million shares issued to the trustee/ 
directors are unpaid. Thus they carry no right to participate 
in capital or income. This raises the possibility that s.s.a 
applies. Further by S.40(4) a nominee is included within the 
taint of being a subsidiary. Thus if the directors are held 
to be nominees for Lion then not merely (a) of S.158(2) will 
be operated but also the main provision and (c). 
POSITION OF DIRECTORS: 
The first step in assessing whether the Androcles directors 
are nominees for Lion is to define the term nominee. 
'Nomineet is largely a statutory term, It must therefore be 
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used in context. S.2 of the Companies Act is silent. The 
Shorter Oxford states that a nominee is a person named in 
connection with, or the recipient of an annuity grant etc.,or 
one ·who is nominated for some office. The legal dictionaries 
are either silent3 or refer to old UK cases on the practice 
of having a nominee for lunatics. The term is used unhelpfully 
in the UK Finance Act 1936 C.34 S.19(2)b: the National Health 
Insurance Act 1936 S.32 C.2(2) and the National Health Insurance 
Amendment Act 1938 C.14 S.1(1). However an extensive NZ 
statutory definition can be found in the Overseas Investment 
Regulations 1974. 4 
This use is in ·the context of Overseas Investment and is 
expressly stated to be a definition "in relation to an overseas 
person." Nevertheless it may cast light on the subject because 
(1) Both terms are used in the context of preventing 
avoidance of statutory provision by the use of 'nominees' 
and 
(2) There is little else available in the way of guidelines 
to determine the content of the word 'nominee.' 
Under Regulation 2 nominee ~tatus occurs when the nominee is 
"directly or indirectly controlled'' (2a); or (2b) directly or 
indirectly controls or is interested in (beneficially or otherwise) 
any shares in the capital of that (overseas) person or a 
nominee of that (overseas) person;" or, 2 (b) (ii), is entitled, 
directly or indirectly, to any part of the profits of the overseas 
person or a nominee of the overseas person; or where the 
acquisition of those shares or the entitlement to that part of 
those profits was entered into or obtained for the benefit of 
an(overseas) person or a nominee for an overseas person or 
3. e.g. Hinde NZ Law Dictionary, Words & Phrases Legally Defined 
4. In Amendment No.l. 1978/79 
,. 
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(c) Where there is "direction or control" whether direct or 
indirect, general, or specific, "whether or not the direction 
or control is legally enforceable; or, 
(d) · The person is "agent, trustee, representative or in any way 
acts m behalf of" or "in any way subject to the direction, 
control or influence of the (overseas) person whether or not 
in respect of the transaction, the relationship between that 
person and the (overseas) person or nominee is such as to confer 
legally enforceable rights on either party, or 
(e) (i) action "jointly or in concert" takes place; or, 
(ii) the person undertakes or participates in any 
transaction in consequence of any arrangement" 
applying again whether or not legally enforceable 
rights are conferred. 
So nominee status here is incurred where ( 1) the principal 
directly or indirectly controls the nominee or the nominee 
is subject to influenCEar(2) where the nominee is interested in 
share capital of tlE p:incipil cr(3) is entitled to a share of profits 
of tre p:incir:al cr(4) where acquisition of shares or entitlement to 
profits of principal takes place for the benefit of the principal 
or where the person is agent, trustee, representative or acts 
in any way on behalf oftrep:in:::ipal. 
Further it would seem that it is irrelevant whether (a) the 
control is direct, indirect, general or specific or whether 
(b) legally enforceable relations exist . 
With the different statutory context certain glosses will take 
place" 'influence' as used in 2d must mean "substantial 
commercial influence", the 'interest in share capital' trigger 
for nominee status cannot apply here for then a company could 
not hold otherwise than as a nominee: this is clearly inconsistent 
with S.40. Such a holding would probably have to be of such a 
size or significance to provide a substantial degree of control. 
• 8 
The directors of Androcles hold on a basis that fulfils nearly 
all of these indices of nominee status. 
Indirect control is exerted by the mutual directorship they 
hold: the directors hold shares which are used as a part of 
the controlling block. The acquisition of Androcles shares, 
indeed the creation of Androcles~expre s sly took place for the 
benefit of the principa l. Further the directors hold under 
trust for Lion shareholders thus fulfilling yet another of the 
identifying factors.5 
The overview of the directors situation confirms the technical 
analysis. They are there by Lion, for Lion and of Lion. 
They are nominees for Lion. Thus section 158(1) and S.158(l)c 
are operated as well as S.158(1)a. Section 40 is in turn operated by 
each of 1::h:? a::o.,e & thus voids the share allotment from Androcles 
to Lion and to the directors. 
Two further points arise. An exception to both S.40 and S.158 
arises where the subsidiary is a trustee under S.40(2) and 
S.158(3)a and b. Here the subsidiary holds its shares outright. 
The mischief arises with effective voting control and the wide 
use of staff benevolent funds under trust does not avoid this 
mischief. 
Finally S.40 only covers two levels, a nominee for a subsidiary. 
By adding more companies the effect of the act can easily be 
evaded. 
5. For the corporation is not distinct from the corporators; 
see page 15 post for the passage from Greenhalgh v. Aderne. 
• • , 
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IMPROPER PURPOSE 
Were the Lion directors acting within their powers in the
 
the share swap with Androcles? 
The first point to make is that the Lion board were certa
inly 
empowered to issue shares. This is clear under the provis
o to 
Article 48 which excepts shares swaps from the proportion
al 
allotment requirement. 
The point we are dealing with here is whether the validity
 
of their act was vitiated by an improper purpose. 
It is unclear whether this should be treated as an aspect 
of 
ultra vires. As Gower notes 6 "But it makes for clarity
 to 
distinguish between an act ultra vires the directors becau
se 
they have usurped a power they never had, and an act which
 
prima facie is within the powers delegated to them but wh
ich they 
have abused by exercising it for an improper purpose." 
Gower goes on to state 7 as an example of a
n improper purpose, 
"Thus directors will normally be authorised to issue furth
er 
capital but they will be liable if they exercise this or a
ny 
other power for the purpose of maintaining their control o
f the 
company." Gower is unclear here because in none of the UK
 or 
commonwealth decisions can any trace of liability attachin
g to 
the directors be found: the result is for their action to 
be 
voidable. However his statement otherwise reflects an im
portant 
question: which purposes are proper in the context of the 
directors exercising their fiduciary power to issue shares
? 
The question of improper purpose for a share issue arose i
n Punt 
v. Symons & Co Ltdg. There the directors had issued share
s with 
the object of creating a sufficient majority to pass a spe
cial 
6. In his Modern Company Law (3rd Edition) at Page 512. 
7. Ibid P.512 
8. (1903) 2 Ch. 506 
• • • • ,. 
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resolution depriving other shareholders of rights conferred 
under the articles. Byrne J. set forth a test for proper 
purpose 9 " .... primarily it is given then for the pu
rpose of 
enabling them to raise capital when required for the purposes 
of the company." There may be occasions when the director 
may fairly and properly issue shares in the case of a company 
constituted like the present for other reasons. For instance, 
it would not be at all an unreasonable thing to create a sufficient 
number of shareholders to enable statutory powers to be .exercised: 
but when I find a limited issue of shares to persons who are 
obviously meant and intended to secure the necessary statutory 
_majority in a particular interest, I do not think that is a fair 
and bona fide exercise of the power." 
It could be deduced from this case that: 
(1) A power to issue shares is given mainly for the purpose 
of raising capital 
(2) Other reasons connected with the efficient running 
of the company may also be allowable 
(3) An exercise of the power to alter the balance of 
power is bad. 
The case of Piercy v. S Mills & Co Ltd10 seems to carry the 
third proposition even further. There the directors had issued 
shares with the object of creating a sufficient majority to 
enable them to block the election of 3 additional directors who 
would have put the existing 2 in a minority. 
Peterson J 11stated " .... directors are not entit
led to use 
their powers of issuing shares merely for the purpose of 
maintaining their control or the control of themselves and their 
9. Ibid at 515 
10. 1920 1 Ch. 77 
11. Ibid at 84 
-,. 
• 
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friends over the affairs of the company, or merely for the 
purpose of defeating the existing majority of shareholders." 
This passage would seem to indicate that the third proposition 
could be extended to a situation where the directors did not 
contravene the wishes of an existing majority but reinforced 
the power of that majority. It must be admitted that the case 
was an attempt by a minority to issue shares to retain power and 
thus the phrase is dicta. The better view is still that the 
word 'or' is used disjunctively and maintenance of control and 
defeating the wishes of an existing majority are two distinct 
improper purposes. But are the board restricted only this far? 
The limits : of shareholders protection were thoroughly canvassed 
in the Savoy Hotel case. The facts are complex and will be set 
out at length here. The investigation was made under s.165(b) 
of the UK Companies Act 1948. The case never reached court and 
the Board of Trade12 report by E Milner Holland Q.C. is all 
we have on this situation. 
DRAMATIS PERSONAE: 
Savoy Hotel Ltd: Public company incorporated in 1889. It 
had an authorised capital of 250,000 pounds of 1 pound 7% non-
cumulative preference shares: 753,699 pounds of 1 pound ordinary 
stock and 96,301 pounds of 1 pound ordinary shares. All the 
preference and ordinary stock had been issued and was fully paid 
up. No ordinary shares had been issued. Under the articles 
each ordinary share had one vote. 
Berkely Hotel Ltd: Public company incorporated in 1896. 
Its capital structure consisted of: 
30,000 5% 1 pound preference shares 
40,000 6 % 1 pound 2nd preference shares 
60,000 1 pound ordinary shares 
12 . HMSO 1954 
" an 
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All had been issued, paid up, and owned by Savoy Hotel Ltd 
since 1901. 
Under the articles the business of the company was managed by 
the directors and the board could exercise all powers of the company 
subject to the regulations made in general meeting. The Directors 
of the Berkely were the same as those of the Savoy bar 1 (a Mr 
Hannay) who was on the Savoy Board but not the Berkely. 
NEW CLARIDGES LTD: Public company incorporated in 1894. Its 
capital of 150,00 pounds was divided into 15,000 shares of 
10 pounds each. All of this was issued, paid up and had been 
owned by the Savoy since 1889. Again the boards were co-extensive 
except for the absence on the New Claridge Board of Mr Hannay. 
Beaufort Construction Ltd: Public company incorporated in 1948. 
It had an authorized and issued capital of 1,000 pounds comprised 
of 600 1 pound 5% preference shares and 800 10 shilling ordinary 
shares. Again these were entirely owned by Savoy. The company 
were builders and did maintenance on hotels owned by the group. 
Worcester Buildings Company (London) Ltd: Incorporated in 1953. 
It had a capital of 650,000 pounds comprised of 540,000 1 pound 
1st preference shares, 100,000 2nd 1 pound preference shares 
and 200,000 ordinary shares of 1 shilling each. 
The 2nd preference and ordinaries conferred votes but the 1st 
preference shares did not except when their rights were affected 
by a proposed change in the company's regulations. Thus 540,000 
pounds of a total capital of 650,000 pounds was excluded from 
the decision-making process. Messrs Thornwill and Hannay(both on 
the Savoy board) were directors. 
The circumstances of the creation of this last company were that 
the hotel properties were undervalued on the books and producing 
low earnings. Stock in Savoy was being acquired by unidentified 
buyers. A takeover bid was in the offing. 
13 
The Scheme: Having incorporated wo~cester the Savoy/Berkely 
directors sold the Berkely to Woncester with the consideration 
being given in shares. Specifically 323,000 3½ % 1st preference 
shares and 65,000 6 % 2nd preference shares. There was an 
immediate 50 year lease back. The lease contained two covenants, 
vital to the scheme. These were (1) to retain the hotel and 
restaurant portion of the premises as such, and (2) not to use the 
ground floor and basement otherwise than as restaurant, kitchens 
etc without written permission of Worcester. 
A similar operation took place between Worcester and Simpsons-in-the-
Strand. This time the covenant in one of the leases was to 
retain the use of Stone's Chop House as a restaurant. 
A further divesting operation took place between Beaufort and 
Worcester on a Cornwall Road property. 
There the covenant was for written consent prior to a change 
from use of the premises of carpentry, upholstering and other 
hotel maintenance ancillaries. There the consent was not to 
be unreasonably withheld, a stipulation not extant in the other 
two leases. 
This left ownership of the properties in Worcester and most of 
the share capital of Worcester in the hands of the Hotel companies. 
In view of the unbalanced capital to voting structure it is 
important to see the kinds of shares the companies received. 
1st preference 
Berkely 323,000 
Simpsons-in-the-Strand 130,000 
Beaufort Construction Ltd 67,000 
520,000 
2nd preference 
65,000 
25,000 
10,000 
100,000 
Worcester had issued all but 20,000 1st preference shares and 
all2nd preference shares. This left 200,000 1 shilling ordinaries, 
carrying the bulk of voting control. Of these, 4 were taken up 
(AW l!BRAR'T 
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by the subscribers to Wo~cester and the rest were issued for 
cash as one holding in joint names to Wontener, Sir Alan Smith 
and Dr Gordon. Dr Gordon was the hotel doctor, Sir Alan Smith 
a senior partner in the hotel's auditors while Wontener was 
the chairman of the Savoy. 
For may years Savoy had set aside funds for "staff superannuation 
and benevolent" purposes. This money was, however, the absolute 
property of the company. A declaration of trust was made and 
the money was transferred to them as trustees. They used this 
money to purchase the Ordinaries. Thus the trustees held 
voting control of Savoy subject only to a duty to the 
beneficiaries. This raises an interesting possibility that they 
would have breached their trust by refusing a huge offer for 
thoseshares. This did not here arise. 
The vital point to realise was that the effect of these 
transactions was to deprive a majority shareholding in Savoy 
of the right to change use of the buildings. Such a power 
rested in the trustees of the staff fund who had control 
of Worcester. As the profit in a takeover depended on changing 
the use of well-positioned buildings with low earning;this 
-effectively made such an offe~ unattractive. 
E Milner Holland's conclusions on the facts were 13 
(1) The object of the scheme was to deny a majority of Savoy 
shareholders the power to change the business or sell the 
hotels. 
(2) The directors believed the action was for the benefit of 
stockholders. 
(3) He was satisfied that the scheme was not implemented for 
any reasons of personal gain on the part of the Savoy directors. 
There was little doubt that, apart from the improper ··purpose 
possibility, the scheme was valid as the articles provided14 
13. Ibid at page 22 
14. Article 83 
is 
for the delegation of ma nagement of the business to the b
oard 
and (Article 84) that the board could dispose of the comp
any's 
unde rta king for such consideration as the directors saw f
it. 
Property and rental prices were fixed by valuers and there
 was 
no question of bad faith there. 
On the question of bona fides counsel for the directors ca
me 
up with a very broad interpretation of bona fides in the 
"best 
interests of the company." 
He argued that "the compa ny" does not mean the sectional 
interest or some or a majority of present members or even 
all 
or present members but covered present and future members 
of the 
company on the footing that it would be continued as a go
ing 
concern balancing a long term view against short term inte
rests 
or present members." 
There is no doubt that "the best interests of the company"
 is 
not interpreted in this country in the extreme realist sen
se 
of economic advantage for the entity. Evershed MR noted 
that 
the phrase "the company as a whole" does not, at any rate 
in 
such a case as the present, mean the company as a commerc
ial 
entity as distinct from the corporators," in Greehhalgh v.
 
Arderne Cinema15E Milner Holland did not disagree
 with this 
view. It would seem that the actions of Lion expressly ai
med 
at protecting future shareholders were"bona fide in the b
est 
interests of the company as a whole" and made on the ba
sis 
of the correct test. 
On the question of whether the articles were used for a pr
oper 
purpose Mr E Milner Ho~land Q.C. found against the company
, 
starting from the basis of Piercy v. S Mills & Co Lt16wher
e 
15. (1951) Ch D CA at 291 
16. (1920) 1 Ch 77 
16 
a power to issue shares given to raise capital was improperly 
used to affect control,he examined the present situation. 
As Samuel (the offeror) did not have control of the company there 
was no question of affecting an existing majority. What he 
found as the purpose of the powers exercise here was 17 
"The exercise of the directors powers was therefore used 
in order to render irrevocable for all time the policy 
view of the present Board." 
He continued18
11 In my opinion, such a use of the director's 
powers is in principle not distinguishable from an issue of 
shares to affect voting power, and, however proper the motive 
behind it, is not a purpose for which those powers were 
conferred on the Board." 
From this we can see that Holland saw the entrenchment of a 
policy as an improper purpose and on a par with the issue of 
shares to affect voting power. Holland 1·s most definitive 
staternent19 on this ca
tegory of improper purpose is "powers 
conferred by the shareholders on directors for the purpose of 
managing the business of the company cannot be used for the 
purpose of depriving those shareholders of such control as 
under the regulations of the company they may have over the 
company's assets." 
Although this extension of the category of improper purposes 
is not within the formal precedent system it nevertheless ties 
in well with the statement of Byrne Jin Punt v. Symons 20 which 
limited the proper purposes of a general power to issue shares 
to the raising of capital and certain ancillaries. 
The most important case in the area is Howard Smith Ltd v. Ampol 
Petroleum Ltd. 
17. At page 27 of the Board of Trade Report 
18. Idem 
19. Idem 
20. Cited at Footnote 9 
II 17 
Two companies Aml':> Ol and Bulks hips held 55% of the issued capital 
of Millers. Ampol made an offer for all the shares but another 
company Howard Smith Limited annotreej its intention to make a higher 
offer. Millers directors recommended the rejection of the Ampol 
offer. Howard Smith Limited applied to the directors for an allotment 
of 4½ million ordinary shares when Ampol and P.ulkships stated their 
intention to reject any offer for their shares. The directors of 
Millers issued the shares to Howard Smith Limited. 
This meant 1) Millers gained needed capital 
2) Ampol and Bulksliips lost their majority: it was 
reduced from 55% to 36.6% 
3) Howard Smith Limited was placed in a position of 
strength, allowing it to make an effective takeover 
offer. 
Ampol Petroleum Limited challenged the validity of the issue on the 
grounds of an improper purpose motivating issue. The judge at 
first instance agreed and Howard Smith Limited appealed. Lord 
Wilberforce delivering the judgment of the Privy Council star°td by 
stating the findings of fact made by Street J. at first instance. The 
first of these was that the Millers directors "were not motivated 
by any purpose of personal gain or advantage or by any desire to 
retain their position on the board 11 22 The second
 important point 
was that the company was in a situation of tight liquidity but had 
a policy of loan rather than share financing and was not in a situation 
of crisis or pressing need. The finding of fact as to the purpose 
motivating the issue was: 23 
"The conclusion I have reached is that the primary purpose 
of the four directors in voting in favour of this allotment 
was to reduce the proportionate contained shareholdings of 
Ampol and Bul}i.ships in order to induce Howard Smith Limited 
to proceed with its takeover offer .•... Their intention was 
to destroy its character as a majority and (at !1) The ultimate 
purpose was to procure the continuation by Howard Smith's of 
the takeover offer made by that company." 
21. 1974 A.C. 821 
Ibid at 831 D to E 
Per Street J. cited at first instance at 833F. 
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Their Lordships said: 24 
"In their Lordships opinion it is necessary to start 
with a consideration of the power whose exercise is in 
question, in this case a power to issue shares. Having 
ascertaine:l a-iafair view, the nature of this power, and 
having defined as can best be done in the light of modern 
conditions the, or some, limits within which it may be 
exercised, it is then necessary for the court, if a 
particular exercise of it is challenged to examine the· 
substantial ~urpose for which it is exercised, and to reach 
a conclusion whether that purpose was proper or not." 
This test represents an astonishing jump in sophistication as 
compared with the earlier tests. 25 In
 the writer's opinion this 
sterns from the developments in the concept of ultra vires 
in administrative law and may well presage further borrowings. As 
an example of this it is instructive to cor:nare the breadth of 
the view of the power inherent in this test with Lord Reid's 
celebrated test in Ridge v Baldwin. 26 A
lthough Lord Wilberforce 
spends page 836 on a rationalisation of the old cases with the new 
approach it is easy to see that the concentration on the nature 
of the power as defined by its limits owes far more to Lord Reid's 
judgrnent and subsequent developments than to the pedestrian 
Puntv Symons concentration on some notional purposes for which a 
power given by an article should be used. 
The practical effect of this is to give us a test that can be applied 
to the muddy area first defined in ~uttv Symons where Byrne J. stated 
that the purpose of a power to issue shares was to raise canital but 
that an undefined field where shares could properly be issued 
for other reasons existea27 . Alth
ough his example of such a case, 
24. Ibid at 835 F 
25. e.g. ~ut v Symons, Hogg & Crornphorn, Bamford v Bamford cited post 
26. 1964 AC 40 
27. Cited at footnote 9 
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the creation of a sufficient number of shareholders to enable 
statutory powers to be exercised, seemed to have very narrow 
parameters it nevertheless led to the emphasis being placed on 
those purooses which are improper rather an those which are 
proper. 
This led to the conceptual difficulty in this field being one of 
polarisation. 
The cases in this area concentrate on building a body of case-law 
on what purposes the directors may not have thus encroaching on 
the "other reasons" phrase used by Byrne J. 
means of dealing with this no-mans land. The 
by Lord Wilberforce can be used to rationally 
but never providing a 
approach laid down 
attack situations 
where the directors have in good faith exercised a power to issue 
shares with a purpose other than the raising of capital but which 
is not tainted as an improper purpose under the present case-law. 
A thorny problem arises in the effect of a power being one of 
management. The rule in Automatic Self Cleansing Filter Syndicate 
Co Limited v Cunningham 28 is tha
t a majority of shareholders 
cannot control the directors in the exercise of a management power. 
The cases of Harlowe's Nominees Linited v Woodside (Lakes Entrance) 
Oil Co. N.L 29and
 of Teck Corporation Limited v Millar 30 we
re dis-
tinguished in the Ampol case on the basis of lack of management 
consideration Lord Wilberforce states 31 "By c
ontrast to the cases 
of Harlowe and Teck, the present case on the evidence, does not, on 
the findings, of the trail judge, involve any considerations of 
management, within the proper sphere of the directors." Both cases 
were held to be cases where the directors acted with a proper 
purpose. It would seem that some sort of a distinction in the purpose 
required is made between management and non-management use of a 
given power. 
28. (1906)2 Ch. 34 
29. (1968)121 CLR 483 
30. (1972)33 DLR (3d) 288 
31. at s~n c 
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This is supported by Lord Wilberforce's statement 32 th
at a court 
"will respect their (the directors) judgment as to matte
rs of 
management" and most strongly of all , '\(\:: his statement33 
"Their 
Lordships accept that such a matter as the raising of fin
ance is 
one of management within the responsibility of the direc
tors: they 
accept that it would be wrong for a court to substitute 
it's opinion 
for that of management, or indeed to question the correct
ness of the 
management's decision on such a question, if bona fide a
rrived at. 
There is no appeal from manag8ment decisions to courts o
f law; nor 
will courts of law presume to act as some kind of superv
ising board 
over decisions within the powers of management honestly a
rrived at." 
This statement would seem to indicate that whet'e ___ · a given
 power 
is expressedly used for management purposes>and raising f
inance is 
one of these on the authority of the passage quoted abov
e,- the courts 
cannot question purposes but only bona fide. 
Furthermore, paragraph G indicates that bona fidescan be 
questioned 
if the directors are wrong in their decision. This would
 seem to 
conflict directly with the statement that the court cann
ot question 
bona fide decisions of directors, for that is required be
fore reach-
ing a conclusion that they were wrong and using this to d
iscount 
the directors bona fides. 
On examination of Tech and Harlowe it seems that managem
ent purposes 
may well be another name for proper purposes. This reduc
es the 
statement on P. 8 line 32 to a tautology. 
However taking the other approach and trying to draw a d
istinction 
between fiduciary and 
directors power under 
to the power to issue 
such a matter as the 
the responsibility of 
32. At 835 G 
33. At 832 G 
34. At 834 B 
35. At 832 E 
management powers is not helpful, for 34he 
this article is a fiduciary power" referring 
shares, and 35 
"Their Lordships accept that 
raising of finance is one of management, within 
the directors." 
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From this one would deduce that the courts will interfere with 
the exercise of a power when it does not appear to have been 
exercised for management purposes. 
But what are management purposes? On the authority of Punt v. Symons 
and indeed Ampol itself they go farther than the raising of finance 36 
but nowhere are they defined. Indeed Lord Wilberforce having 
distinguished Tech and Harlowe 37 then a
bandons the management term 
and returns to the policy of accretions to the meaning of the 
phrase "improper purpose" to deal with the matter at harid. 
Indeed the term "management purpose" was unhelpful until the 
Arnpol case. It was there given force within a broader constitutional 
analogy. This will be discussed later. The point to note here is 
that up to Arnpol the phrase was a source of confusion. This was 
reflected in Arnpol itself. However, a method of using the distinction 
was provided there. 
Can we now reach any synthesis of the above cases to lay down an 
algorithm for the determination of whether in any given case a 
power to issue shares is exercised for a proper purpose? 
Because of the polarised development of law in this area such 
an exercise must be defined in three parts: purposes which are 
expressly within the scope of a general power to issue shares: 
purposes expressly without and the area of purposes which, so 
far, are in neither camp. 
Examining purposes which have been held to be proper in this 
context we start with the Punt v. Symons rule: the power to issue 
shares is mainly for the purpose of raising finance. Tech's 
case added to this in that Berger J found 38 "their purp
ose was 
to obtain the best agreement they could while still in control. 
36. See 835c 
37. At 847c 
38. At 328 
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Their purpose was, in that sense to defeat Tech. But, not to 
defeat Tech's attempt to obtain control, rather it was to 
foreclose Tech's opportunity of obtaining for itself the ultimate 
deal. That was ... no improper purpose," 
The reason that the allotment was made with a proper purpose 
here was presumably that the power to contract is a management 
one thus the courts will allow sharESissued for the purpose of 
avoiding forced entry into a contract. This was certainiy how 
the Privy Council treated the case in Ampol. 
On the other hand we have the Punt v. Symons formulation 
"to secure a majority" used in the sense of altering the 
balance of power, being bad. This was extended to include 
maintaining control by directors and friends in Eiercy v S Mills 
and avoiding a takeover, at least where this was done by rendering
 
a policy view irrevocable or depriving the shareholders of such 
control as they may have under the articles under the reasoning 
in the Savoy Hotel case. In Mills v. Mills 39 i
t was accepted 
in the High Court of Australia that an issue merely for the 
purpose of altering voting power was invalid. 
Finally we have the leading case. Howard Smith v. Ampol which 
sets out the approach to the ground between these two bodies 
of case-law. This is to consider the nature of the power, its 
possible limits, then to make an objective evaluation of the 
substantial purpose for which it is exercised and a determination 
of whether that exercise is within the limits. 
This approach is in itself inadequate. Ampol gave force to it 
through the importation of the constitutional analogy. This is 
done 40 w
here Lord Wilberforce says "And, though the reported 
decisions, naturally enough, are expressed in terms of their own 
facts, there arc clear considerations of principle to support the 
trend they establish. 
39. 60 CLR 150 
40. At 837E 
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The constitution of a limited company normally provides for 
directors, with powers of management, and shareholders, with 
defined voting powers having power to appoint the directors, 
and to take, in general meeting, by majority vote, decisions 
on matters not reserved for management." 
and41 " ... it must be unconstitutional for directors to use 
their fiduciary powers over the shares in the company purely 
for the purpose of destroying an existing majority, or creating 
a new majority which did not previously exist. To do so is to 
interfere with that element of the company's constitution which 
is separate from and set against their powers." 
The previously pointless term "management powers" is now given 
a new function in the context of a separation of powers and 
the constitutional analogy is continued with the adoption of 
an approach from administrative law. The evil is seen as an 
interference with the right of a shareholder to decide to whom 
he shall sell his shares or the price he set~2 It should be 
noted that the fact that the shareholders were in a majority 
plays no part in this reasoning although anomalously a majority 
can ratify. This seems to be the meaning of the statemen~
3 The 
right to dispose of shares at a given price is essentially 
an individual right to be exercised on individual decision and 
on which a majority, in the absence of oppression or similar 
impropriety, is entitled to prevail." The question of ratification 
will be looked at in greater detail later. 
It should be noted that the exercise here is one of interpretation 
of articles. A presumption exists that a general power to issue 
shares exists mainly for the raising of capital. Should this 
be negatived in the memorandum or even the articles then the above 
caselaw simply would not apply. In the Lion situation no such 
contrary statement exists. Article 47 simply confers a power to 
issue shares. The presumption applies. 
41. At 837 
42. At 8381\ 
43. At 837H 
24 
What then were the director's purposes in the issue? In the 
first letter to shareholders dated 17 January 1978 paragraph 
3 ready "The Board of Lion Breweries Limited is deeply conscious 
of the interests of the general body of shareholders and has 
taken these steps to safeguard those interests." 
This however seems to reflect motive rather than purpose. In 
paragraph 7 the Chairman states two purposes: the first to 
prevent overseas control and the second to protect ordinary 
shareholders. 
In Sir Clifford's letter to the stock exchange of 9 January 
1978 he states, at paragraph 5, "In making these arrangements 
the Directors of Lion Breweries Limited have acted, in their 
view, in the best interests of shareholders as a whole to 
safeguard their interests against the possibility of asset 
stripping operations which might deny shareholders the ability 
in the long te~m to profit from the strong backing of the 
company's shares" and at para. 7 "The Directors consider that 
they should act to prevent a takeover by inches at prices 
substantially less than the fair value of the company." 
There can be no doubt that the purposes of the move were to 
influence the balance of power, to maintain a present majority 
by the issue of capital purely to affect voting power, to 
discourage a takeover bid and possibly to maintain the present 
policies of the board of directors. These are all improper 
purposes by the previous argument. There can equally be no 
doubt but that the directors acted in good faith. This is 
irrelevant to the impropriety of purpose. 
Thus the share allotment was bad 
SCOPE OF THE INVALIDITY 
What of the ancillaries to the allotment? This category would 
include the creation of Androcles, the allotment of Androcles 
shares and trust deed. 
I 
• 
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In Hogg v. Cramphor~ 4t~e 
directors allotted 5,707 shares to 
newly created trust for the benefit of employ
ees paid for by 
interest free loan from the comapny. The tru
stees were the 
defendant directors. Later the Board advance
d 28,293 pounds 
to the trustees for purchase of preference sh
ares from 
shareholders. The original allotment was to 
secure control for 
the director/trustees. An attempt to attach 
extra votes to the 
shares was inconsistent with the articles and
 void. However 
the advance was to45 
"forestall criticism by preference shareholde
rs of the 
directors having burked an opportunity for th
em to 
dispose of their preference shares at the adm
ittedly 
advantageous price of 25 shillings a share, a
nd to 
obtain for the trustees the votes attached to
 these shares 
as a further means of procuring for the board
 the support 
of a controlling interest in the company." 
He then stated that the transaction was taint
ed using the test 
of "an integral part of the scheme." Here bo
th allotments 
and the trust deed would fall. Androcles its
elf was not formed 
by Lion sotwill survive. 
vanish. 
Its substratum would, however, 
In summary, the allotment to Androcles is voi
dable as is the 
allotment of Androcles shares to its director
s and the trust deed 
they held under. Apart from its position on 
actions related 
to the scheme, Hogg v. Cramphorn agreed with 
the Punt v. Symons 
and Piercy v. S Mills Ltd view quoting both c
ases extensively. 
It did not mention the Savoy Hotel case. In 
Hogg v. Cramphorn, 
however, the action was stood over to allow ti
me for ratification 
by a general meeting. A condition imposed by
 Buckley J was that 
the 5,707 new shares should not vote. The ra
tification was 
obtained and there the matter ended. 
44. (1967) Ch. D. 254 
45. Per Buckley J at 270 
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RATIFICATION 
This raises the possible validating line of ratification. The 
Lion directors opted to try this and the general meeting 
convened for the purpose overwhelmingly ratified on 29 June 
1978. The effect of this will now be discussed. 
Actions of directors which are beyond their power through 
being made for an imprope r purpose yet are within the powers 
of the company can be ratified by ordinary resolution at a 
general meeting. The Lion directors took this option and 
II received ratification. What is the effect of this? The 
• 
first question is as to the duty on the members when voting. 
Lord Lindley M.R. in Allen v. Gold Reefs of West Africa stated 46 
that shareholders had to exercise their votes "bona fide for 
the benefit of the company as a whole" importing the same 
rules as for the directors. 
This view would render most ratifications voidable as the 
shareholders vote on the same issues and often for the same 
purposes as the directors. However a strong contrary line of 
authority contends that shareholders are simply not subject to 
such a duty: votes are proprietary rights and can be exercised 
in any manner and from any motive the holder wishes - Burland v. 
Earle 47c, Goodfellow v. Nelson 
Line 48 . 
It can be seen that we have two fundamentally opposing principles. 
The first is that the shareholders are constrained by a fiduciary 
duty to the company when voting; the second, that a voting right 
is a proprietary right, rather like the amount issued on dividend, 
and the shareholder can do what he pleases with it. 
46. (1900) 1 Ch. at 671 
4 7. ( 19 0 2) AC 8 3 PC 
48. (1912) 2 Ch 324 
II 
• 
II 
II 
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Mahoney Jin Winthrop v. Winns 49 express
ed a doubt as to 
whether the issue had yet been clearly settled50 . 
"It has 
not yet been settled whether, if the purpose of that majo
rity 
be that which the directors are here assumed to have, viz
, 
the defeating of the Winthrop take-over, that will be an 
improper purpose of that majority within the principles 
adverted to in NgurJi v. McCann51 
He then proceeds to note that Bamford v. Ban~ord is silen
t 
on the question and that a "serious question" remains to 
be 
argued. But what will the situation be if the Ngurliand 
Mahoney J 
line is adopted. 
The first is that a fiduciary duty between the shareholde
r 
and company must be created. This would appear to have th
e 
same effective content as that owed to the company by the 
directors. Both must act "bona fide with regard to the inte
rests 
of the company as a whole." 
This would effectively end ratification for a ratification
 
would usually be for the same improper purpose as that of 
the 
director. It is possible to imagine a situation where the
 
shareholders, acting with a proper purpose, would ratify t
he 
actions and improper purpose of the board. It is difficu
lt 
to imagine such a situation in the takeover field. 
The second problem lies in the difficulty of ascertaining 
the purposes of the shreholders in voting. Any attempt to
 
apply the same objective test as is applied to directors w
ould 
sink in sordid seas of evidence (e.g. Oh, I always vote fo
r 
Sir Clifford, he has such a nice face x 18000 shareholde
rs). 
Thus one is inevitably in the situation o~ applying two d
ifferent 
tests. The only possible merit of the Allen Rule, symmet
ry, is 
apparent but not real. 
49. 1975 2NSWLR 666 
50. Ibid at 707D 
51. 1953 90 CLR 425 
II 
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The second test could be provided by
 looking at the material 
put before the shareholders by direc
tors. Presumably material 
put forward by the offeror would no
t count on the basis that 
shareholders may doubt ~s credibility. This would accord
 
with the decision on the relevance o
f material supplied by 
third parties in Winthrop. 
However the material must disclose t
he actual improper purpose 
for a ratification to be valid, Bu
t if it does, then a court 
is likely to find that the sharehold
ers have voted for this 
II purpose. Even if the directors circulate a memorandum saying 
"we issued these shares for the imp
roper purpose of avoiding 
• 
a takeover. However our company als
o needs funds and we 
suggest that you think of this as yo
u cast your votes" a 
court will look at the purpose of th
e exercise of power 
objectively and is very likely to fi
nd that the ratification 
was made for the improper purpose. 
The power to ratify is 
again effectively removed by this ab
surd situation. 
However the horrors do not end here.
 The duty is owed to the 
company as a whole. This definition
 received an expanded 
definition in the Savoy Hotel case a
nd will now probably 
include future shareholders providin
g for a balancing of 
interest between future and present 
shareholders. Present 
shareholders become a factional inte
rest who must vote with 
regard to the interests of future sh
areholders. Could a 
company ever be wound up without bre
aching a fiduciary duty 
to future shareholders? Under what 
conditions could alienation 
of assets take place? 
One approach to the evidentiary prob
lem involved can be found 
in Lord Evershed M R's judgrnent in G
reenhalgh v. Arderne 
Cinemas Ltd52 . 
52. (1951) Ch. D 286. 
I 
~ 
I 
I 
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He tells us to take the case of a hypothe
tical members 3 · 
"That is to say the case may be taken of a
n individual hypothetical 
membe r and it may be asked whether what is
 proposed is in the 
honest opinion of those who voted in its f
avour, for that 
person's benefit." 
The case of Clemens v. Clemenss 4 appe
ared to extend this 
hypothetical member to mean any member. A
n honest belief that 
her vote would be in the interests of the 
plaintiff was required 
of the majority shareholder.SS 
But this argument ignores the qualifying s
tatement Lord Evershed 
M.R. himself made immediately after propos
ing the hypothetical 
member tests 6 . 
"I think that the matter can in practice b
e more accurately 
and precisely stated by looking at the con
verse and by 
saying that a special resolution of this k
ind would be 
liable to be impeached is the effect of it
 were to 
discriminate between the majority sharehol
ders and the 
minority shareholders, so as to give the f
ormer advantage 
of which the latter is de.prived." 
So even Evershed in essence sees this nebu
lous duty on shareholders 
as nothing more or less than the doctrine 
of oppression, albeit 
approached by a circuitous route. 
Further ground for arguing that the existe
nce of a duty on 
shareholders is unhelpful here comes from 
Evershed M.R. 's 
statements 7 "
it is no ground for impeaching the resoluti
on 
that they are considering their own positio
n as equals." 
What kind of fiduciary duty allows the tru
stees to act with 
regard to their own interests? If it is n
ot an improper 
purpose to consider one's own interests th
en can there ever 
be an improper purpose apart from cases of
 oppression? If 
not is there any point in the exercise at 
all? It would seem 
not. If there is a fiduciary duty on shar
eholders it is diffuse 
to the point of gaseousness. If not th
en nothing is lost for 
I 
I 
I 
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Footnotes 
53. Ibid at 291 
54. 1976 2 ALL ER 268 
55; crbid at 281 G 
56. Greenhalgh at 291 
57. Ibid at 291 
the doctrine of oppression covers the same
 field. 
It would seem likely that the courts will 
adopt the Burland v. 
Earle principle that a vote is a proprieta
ry right and not subject 
to any fiduciary duty governing its exerci
se. 
Exten* of the Requirement of Disclosure 
A more difficult question as to the validi
ty of the ratification 
arises with regard to the requirement of d
isclosure. A general 
meeting can only ratify to the extent of i
ts knowledge. Does 
this mean that the impropriety must be dis
closed or will disclosure 
of the purpose suffice it? A director wou
ld not want to disclose 
impropriety expressly. The Lion notice to
 shareholders certainly 
made no reference to it. The argument aga
inst requiring both 
disclosures is that the shareholder knows 
that the actions 
taken were made for an improper purpose or
 in some other way 
beyond the powers of the directors from th
e mere fact the 
ratification is requested. 
This view has the defect that the average 
shareholder in a 
large public company makes no such inferen
ce. He will take 
the situation as presented. The much vaun
ted press is no help. 
At least one cornrnentator ·was impressed wit
h the Lion 'offer' 
to disband Androcles if ratification was n
ot forthcoming. 
However it received an airing in the case 
of Grant v. UK Switchback 
Railways cc 58 . In that
 case the articles of T company authorized
 
58. 1889 40 Ch. D.135 
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the sale of part of its undertaking but prohibited 
directors 
from voting in respect of contracts in which they w
ere interested. 
I The directors of UK Switchback entered into a contract to 
sell part of T company's undertaking to the UK comp
any. Four 
members of each board were in common out of the 5 T
 directors 
and six U directors. 
I 
I 
A general meeting was called of T company to consid
er a resolution 
approving and adopting the agreement but the notice
 did not 
state a ground for · the meeting being necessary. Th
e meeting 
passed an ordinary ~esolution rs:::ti£ying the action 
and a 
shareholder sued. On the question of the validity 
of ratification 
Cotton L H (Lindley & Bowne LJJ agreed on this poin
t) stated 
I "It was argued that the meeting was not good because the notice 
• 
conveying it gave no intimation that the contract w
as one which 
could not be carried into effect without the sanctio
n of a 
general meeting. I think that the difficulty was s
ufficiently 
suggested by the mere fact of a meeting being calledJfor had i
t 
not been for the fact that the directors were inter
ested, no 
meeting would have heen necessary. 
But it is unnecessary to enter into that. A majori
ty of the 
meeting called with due notice of the object for wh
ich it was 
called could make this a contract of this company a
nd it would 
be wrong for the court to interfere with the procee
dings of a 
general meeting as to an act within the powers of th
e comapny . 
This view ignores the fact that the average shareho
lder is not 
" 
an expert in corporate law and does not realize tha
t ratification 
is a requirement for a voidable act to be made good
. He is 
likely to believe that he is being graciously invite
d to express 
his opinion. The second problem with this view is 
that it 
concentrates on ratification of the acts. What is 
at issue is 
the impropriety of purpose. Without knowledge of th
e impropriety 
of purpose there can be no ratification. 
I 
I 
I 
• 
32 
In Irvine v. Union Bank of Aus
trali39the directors had
 exceeded 
a limited power to borrow. Th
is was ratified but later dispu
ted 
on the question of knowledge. 
Article 25 required that a not
ice 
shall be sent to each sharehold
er stating the day and place of
 
business and also the business 
proposed to be transacted there
in. 
Sir Barnes Peacock delivered th
eir lordships' judgment, statin
g60 
"But however this may be their 
Lordships are of opinion that 
there was no evidence to show t
hat any sufficient notice of 
substance or effect of the rep
orts which were intended to be 
presented at the half-yearly m
eetings above referred to, was 
given th the shareholders of th
e company in pursuance of the 
25th clause of the articles of 
association so as to lead the 
absent shareholders to know or 
even to imagine that the direct
ors 
intended to report that they ha
d exceeded their authority, or 
that, by the adoption of the re
port of the directors, to be la
id 
before the meeting an :act of th
e directors in excess of their 
authority could be rendered bin
ding on all the shareholders." 
The ratification in question w
as thus not effective. It woul
d 
be argued that article 25 made 
the difference here. Yet by fa
r 
the more persuasive argument w
ould appear to be that the 
rationale, allowing all shareh
olders to know that what their 
directors have been doing is be
yond their powers is necessary 
to receive a valid ratification
, applies to all cases . 
The case of Bamford v. Bamforg1
is discouraging to this view. 
There a compahy with an authori
zed capital of 1 million, divid
ed 
into 5 million 1 shilling share
s of which 4½ million had been 
issued, allotted the rest at pa
r to one of the company's 
major distributors. At this st
age a bid had been received. T
he 
power to issue unallotted share
s was vested in the directors b
y 
article 12. 
59. 1877 2 A.C 366 PC 
60. Ibid at 378 
61. (1969) 2 WLR 1107 
I 
I 
I 
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A general meeting was called after the plaintiffs had issu
ed 
a writ. The plaintiffs then issued another writ claiming
 that 
any resolution would bearullity. The meeting passed the 
resolution by a substantial majority. 
The Court of Appeal treated ratification as a magic word w
hich 
dissolved all evils. They dealt with another issue then d
ecided 
in favour of the defendant directors on the basis of the 
ratification. There was no consideration of the extent o
f 
ratification at all. This seriously weakens the force of 
this 
judgment. 
An argument for this approach in the present situation can
 be 
expressed as follows. 
The shareholders know the improper purpose, which was to s
tave 
off a takeover bid. 
They (presumably) approved of it as they voted overwhelmi
ngly 
to ratify the action of the board. Whether or not they kn
ow 
that the action was improper in ·a technical sense as being
 
outside the scope of the article conferring the power is 
unlikely to have affected the voting. 
The court should not therefore demand knowledge of the leg
al 
impropriety of purpose before regarding a ratification of 
the 
purpose itself as being valid. 
The case of Winthrop v. Winns 62 giv
es support to the concept 
that disclosure of impropriety of purpose is required. M
ahoney 
J referred to it63 "
 ... can the resolution be now treated as 
affirming or evidencing an intention to affirm, a voidable
 
transaction when the existence of the basis upon which it 
would 
be voidable, viz. the directors collateral purpose was str
enuously 
denied by the directors who promoted the resolutions? 
62. Cited at Footnote 49 
63. Ibid at 706c 
I 
I 
I 
I 
II 
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In my opinion, the requirement that this a
ssumption be made 
renders the resolutions unsatisfactory as 
a basis upon which to 
deal with the dissolution application." 
The dissolution application was directed a
t an injuction 
restraining Winns proceeding with a deal w
hich involved 
Winns Ltd issuing shares to subsidiaries o
f Burns Philp Ltd 
in exchange for retail shares. This would
 have had the effect of 
rendering the offeror's bid impractical. 
The offeror/plaintiff 
had already acquired 14.54 % of the issued 
capital. 
The plaintiff then moved to obtain an inju
nction preventing 
the deal on the grounds of improper purpos
e motivating the 
share issue. Winns Ltd held an extraordin
ary General Meeting 
which passed resolutions approving the dea
l then applied for 
and received a dissolution of the injuncti
on. Winthrops Ltd 
appealed this. For the purposes of the ca
se it was assumed 
that the purposes motivating issue were in
deed improper. 
Thus it can be seem that the question of d
issolution of the 
injuctions rested on the validity of the r
atification and 
MahoneyJ's passage quoted above refers to 
the resolution. 
Samuels J makes a similar statement64 
"But if the directors are 
to get the protection which they seek, the
 resolutions must 
reach well beyond any question of commerc
ial interest. They 
are ineffective, unless they can be regard
ed as having 
authorized a breach of duty, or as having 
waived its consequences. 
I would myself have thought it was clear b
eyond argument that, 
the purpose of the meeting being to excuse
 the directors, 
that purpose must have been clearly stated
, and the nature of 
the contemplated breach of duty clearly di
sclosed by the directors 
seeking to be absolved." 
64. At 684E 
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This passage shows clearly that Samuels J saw the nature of 
the breach and the purpose of the meeting being absolution as 
being two separate elements of purpose and impropriety both 
of which had to be disclosed for effective ratification. He 
cited Kaye v. Croydon Tranways 65 in suppor
t of this argument. 
In that case there was a statutory requirement that the notice 
of extraordinary general meeting should "specify the purpose 
for which the meeting is called." The Court of Appeal held that 
it did not and that66 " ... it is
 too clear, I think for arguemnt, 
that it there are several purposes, then the notice will not 
be sufficient in respect of any purpose which is not indicated 
in the notice at all." 
Samuels J did not advert to the significance of the statutory 
requirement at all. Indeed it seemEdto carry no weight 
in his view of the case and he reaches a conclusion on the matter 
which requires disclosure of impropriety rather than the 
actual purpose67
. 
I "To my mind there was one material fact which was essential 
for the shareholders to know. That was that the directors 
I were proposing to act in breach of their duty
. 
On the basis of this case and of the prior argument it seems 
probable that a ratification requires both disclosures for 
validity. Absolution goes only as far as the confession. 
How does the present situation with regard to the second, and 
it is submitted, more accurate, view? 
The Lion directors did not mention the impropriety of purpose 
in the notice of meeting or in the supplementary notice sent 
out with it. 
6 5 • ( 18 9 5) i Ch 3 5 8 
66. Ibid at 373 Per Rigby L J 
67. Winthrops At 685D 
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The letter of Sir Geoffrey (I am a plain man, not too well versed 
in the intricacies of the law) Roberts admitted that the 
legal situation was ambivalent but stated "That in no way 
discounts the validity of your Directors action (Para. 6). 
The thrust of my argument here is that the meeting could not 
ratify the impropriety of purpose for the issue was never put 
before it. Indeed it would seem that they were misled on 
the point. Therefore the action of the directors in issuing shares 
to Androcles remains voidable. The ratification was of no effect 
on the impropriety of purpose vi~iating the original action. 
Furthermore, even on the Bamford line or argument, we find that 
ratification only extends to the share allotment in the terms 
of the resolution itself. Under the previous argument based 
on Hogg v. Cramphorn all other elements in the transaction would 
still remain void. 
Two further points arise from the Wintb~op case. Neither have 
direct relevanreto the Lion situation in that they are concerned 
with prospective ratifications. However they are of relevance 
in the general defensive share issue contexL. Glass J dissented 
stating that in his opinion there had been full disclosure 
here. His reasoning is summed up68 "The board on this view was 
not craving forgiveness for a contemplated breach of duty. 
Exonerated of any duty by the decision of the general meeting, 
no breach could possibly arise." He felt that the prospective 
ratification fell within the reserve capacity of the company69 . 
"A reserve capacity to exercise the powers of the company would 
include a reserve capacity to authorize the exercise of those 
powers by the board." Nevertheless it would be reasonable to 
assume that impropriety must be disclosed for such exoneration 
on the previous argument. 
Samuels J raised an interesting point regarding the limits of 
ratification. He felt that there could be no prospective 
ratification if that involved the shareholders trespassing on 
management areas. His reasoning was that the shareholders could 
68. Ibid rtt 674F 
69. Ibid at 674C 
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not make a valid exercise of power in the management area 
because the directors were not bound to take the shareholders 
advice. Therefor~6 "They were 
not acts in the law and could 
have no effect." 
This line of reasoning accords ill with the assumption he 
made for the purposes of the hearing, that there is such a 
thing as prospective ratification. However it should be . noted 
that he excludes the doctrine of residual powers from consideration 
and leaves open the point of its application to the present 
situation71
. This may well provide a point of distinction. 
In summary, it would seem that the allotment was void under S.40 
because of the application of S.158. Further the allotment 
was voidable as involving the exercise of a fiduciary power 
for improper purposes and that the ratification did not cure 
this for want of disclosure of impropriety. However no defect 
in the ratification was caused by any mythical duty owed by 
shareholders. 
It is a matter of record that those examining takeovers exhibit 
a special glee in their work absent from much academic writing72 . 
This is probably due to the subject matter. Corporate raiding 
is the most exciting field of business today. 
And because the Androcles scheme took place in the context of 
a real corporate struggle the harsh assessment of its validity above 
must be tempered with one overriding consideration. Lion needed 
time. The Androcles scheme bought it for them. 
70. Ibid at 684A 
71. At 682 C and F 
72. E G LCB Gower in his concluding paragraph in his note on the 
Savoy Case at 1955 68 Harvard Law Review 1176. 
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